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Abstract 
In this paper, we draw on established theoretical works in international political economy to compare 
the empirical impact of the threat of economic sanctions to the actual imposition of economic 
sanctions on international trade. Deepening the analysis, we analyze whether there are any differential 
effects when different instruments are employed. We also examine the international trade effect of 
sanctions at a more disaggregated products level. Thus, we are able to test whether sanctions have any 
adverse effect on essential commodities such as food and medical supplies in contravention of the 
Geneva Convention which stipulates the passage of such essential goods even in times of sanction. To 
achieve this, we use the gravity model as our empirical tool and recent detailed disaggregated data on 
sanctions spanning a long time series from 1960 to 2009. Our results show the impact of threatened 
sanctions differs qualitatively and quantitatively from imposed sanctions. Whereas imposed sanctions 
lead to a decrease in the trade flow between the sender and the target, a threat of sanctions leads to an 
increase in the trade flow. The positive impact of the threat may be due to economic agents in both the 
sender and its target resorting to stockpiling prior to the actual imposition of sanctions to minimize any 
adverse consequences of the sanctions. In addition, we find varying effects for the different sanction 
instruments. Also, the detrimental effect of sanctions extends to essential products. 
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1 Introduction
A historical review of sanctions indicates that there have been quite a number of
threats of sanction which were not carried out ultimately. More currently, the interna-
tional diplomatic landscape has been inundated with rising political tensions between
states accompanied with both threats and impositions of sanctions. As current as
January 2016, China issued a threat to impose sanctions on US defence companies
that sell arms to Taiwan1. However, there exist no empirical studies that focus on
the implications of threats of economic sanctions on international trade. Previous
research has focused exclusively on the trade eﬀect of imposed sanctions (Caruso,
2003; Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, & Oegg, 2007). A few number of studies argues that
the threatening stage is critically relevant in understanding the outcome of sanctions
and the threat of economic sanctions may even be more important than the actual
imposition (Eaton & Engers, 1992; Lacy & Niou, 2004). There are also studies that
attribute the general conclusion of sanctions being ineﬀective to the exclusion of the
threat stage in the sender-target interactions (Whang, McLean, & Kuberski, 2013).
The target's behavior at the threat stage or before the actual imposition may
aﬀect the outcome of sanctions. There may be diﬀerent courses of action available
to the target at the threat stage. A target may decide to comply with just a mere
threat by the sender in order to avoid any negative consequences of the actual impo-
sition. Conversely, the target can defy the threat by adopting strategies ex ante that
could minimize the eventual imposition of the sanctions. Any possible adjustment
to minimize the sanction damage will not be limited to the target alone, as there
are also economic agents within the sender state that will be adversely aﬀected when
the threat is actually implemented. Thus, anticipation of international sanctions can
trigger perverse actions by economic agents within the sender and the target states
that may have negative or positive consequences for international trade (van Bergeijk,
2009). Adopting adjustment measures prior to the actual imposition may not be im-
probable in practice because, even in cases when sanctions have been imposed, targets
adopt strategies such as transshipment to circumvent the sanctions.
Analyses of the eﬀect of trade agreements have changed signiﬁcantly as a result
of considering the anticipation eﬀects. For example, McLaren (1997) shows that the
anticipation eﬀect of negotiating trade agreements can substantially increase the es-
timated impact of signing a free trade agreement. Conversely, Baier and Bergstrand
(2007) highlight the fact that ﬁrms may delay trade temporarily in anticipation of an
impending trade agreement. In addition, there is a literature pertaining to safeguards
and anti-dumping measures that has pointed to anticipation eﬀects  for example,
stockpiling, or immediate diversiﬁcation away from a source of supply that may be-
come subject to a trade measure (see for example, Hoekman and Leidy (1989)). It
was van Bergeijk (2009) who linked the possibility of stockpiling to threat of sanc-
tions. He points to the fact that threat can act as an incentive for potential targets
to stockpile against future negative eﬀects of sanctions. Thus, the net impact of a
threat of sanctions depends on the behavior or attitude of the targets towards risk
and their expectation formation process (van Bergeijk, 1995).
Thus, the basic question in this paper is whether there is any empirical evidence
of anticipation eﬀects of stockpiling when it comes to sanctions. If agents anticipate
sanctions based on signals or threats given by the relevant entities, do they adjust
ex ante? Do ﬁrms adjust production and trade or do consumers adjust consumption
ex ante in order to minimize any ex post damage when the sanctions are eventually
1Reported by Reuters on January 26th, 2016. http://http://blogs.reuters.com/great-
debate/2016/01/26/china-threatens-sanctions-against-u-s-companies-is-this-the-future/
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imposed? Does the data provide such empirical evidence, and how based on theory can
we explain the reaction of ﬁrms and consumers? Is it the case that the eﬀectiveness of
sanctions is reduced if traders can anticipate and adjust sourcing accordingly? Does
the impact of threatened sanctions diﬀer qualitatively or quantitatively from actual
imposed sanctions? These questions have become more relevant today as we witness
the re-emergence of a 'sanction decade'.
Theoretically, it has been argued that the anticipation or a threat of sanctions
produces trade-deteriorating eﬀect comparable to imposed sanctions (see for exam-
ple, Fuchs and Klann (2013); Morrow, Siverson, and Tabares (1998)). Their main
argument is that the threat of sanctions produces political, legal and credit risks for
businesses engaged in international trade. Exposure to these risks will reduce ex-
pected proﬁtability for businesses and ultimately reduce the trade ﬂow between the
sender and its target. However, anticipation of sanctions could also trigger stockpiling
by producers and consumers, especially in the short-run. For international ﬁrms, the
main reason could be the associated large sunk costs that are incurred in changing
export destinations or sources of imports. Similarly for consumers, tastes and prefer-
ences are known to change slowly and hence there is reluctance to alter consumption
bundles because of impending sanctions.
From these theoretical point of views, the tendency of threatened sanctions to
trigger stockpiling may either change the net eﬀect of threatened sanctions qualita-
tively or minimize any negative eﬀects quantitatively. In fact, van Bergeijk and van
Marrewijk (1995) point out that the passage of time between the threat and the im-
position acts as an important incentive for the target to build stockpiles and adjust its
economic structure in advance. Thus, it is plausible that the anticipation of sanctions
may not produce similar eﬀect as actual imposed sanctions because economic actors
can act diﬀerently under imposed sanctions compared to threatened sanctions.
In this paper, we empirically compare the trade eﬀects of threatened and imposed
sanctions by relying on a recent and detailed compilation of the Threat and Imposition
of Economic Sanctions(TIES) database by Morgan, Bapat, and Kobayashi (2014).
Previous studies that focused on the trade eﬀects of sanctions such as Caruso (2003)
and Hufbauer et al. (2007) restrict their analyses to the US as the only sender of
sanctions while Morgan et al. (2014) have shown through their TIES database that
there are other frequent senders of sanctions apart from the US. Interestingly, the data
shows that developing as well as developed countries resort to the use of sanctions
as a foreign policy tool. Although, the US is most frequent sender, there are other
countries such as Canada, Russia, the UK and India that are also frequent senders of
sanctions. Furthermore, the TIES data distinguishes between sanction cases in which
they were mere threats as compared to actual impositions. In addition, it provides
detailed information on diﬀerent sanction instruments of employed by the senders.
Generally, the focus of previous economics literature has been on the eﬀectiveness
of sanctions in altering the behavior of the target state so it complies with the inten-
tions of the sender state. This strand of literature includes studies by Pape (1997),van
Bergeijk (1989), Bapat and Clifton Morgan (2009), etc. The majority of these studies
tend to conclude that sanctions are ineﬀective in persuading the target to change
its objectionable policies. However, whether sanctions are eﬀective or not, they can
still adversely aﬀect the dyadic relationships between the sender and its target. This
could result in reduced dyadic international ﬂows such as trade ﬂows, foreign direct
investment, migration and foreign aid between the sender and its target.
Apart from the dyadic eﬀects, current studies have shown that sanctions have
adverse consequences for target states. They show that the imposition of sanctions
has adverse distributional eﬀects and it is more severe for the poor and the civilian
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population (Afesorgbor & Mahadevan, 2016); it triggers currency crises (Peksen &
Son, 2015); it retards the targets' economic growth and development (Neuenkirch &
Neumeier, 2015) and it widens the poverty gap (Neuenkirch & Neumeier, 2016). These
adverse and unintended consequences of sanctions have shifted the attention of the
international community and researchers to how to minimize the impact of sanctions
on the poor or target the sanctions at speciﬁc groups (so-called smart sanctions).
To reduce the sanction damage for the poor would require knowledge in two speciﬁc
dimensions: ﬁrst, the impact of speciﬁc instruments employed by the sender; second,
the international trade eﬀect of sanctions as to which speciﬁc products are aﬀected,
for instance, whether sanctions aﬀect essential commodities such as food and medical
supplies or luxury goods for the rich. In an attempt to tailor sanctions only the
political leaders of North Korea, the United Nations for instance speciﬁcally banned
the sale of luxury goods to North Korea as Kim Jong-II is believed to be a fan of
products such as Hennesey cognac, iPods, Harley Davidson motorcycle, and plasma
televisions (Hufbauer et al., 2007).
Another strand of literature has shown that political interactions between states
whether good or bad, can have major consequences for bilateral trade between them.
Rose (2007) shows that strong political ties established through state visits signiﬁ-
cantly increase the trade ﬂow between states. Similarly, Nitsch (2007) conﬁrms this
positive eﬀect of state and oﬃcial visits on bilateral exports. Conversely, strained po-
litical relations also disrupt trade ﬂows (Fuchs & Klann, 2013). This therefore makes
bilateral trade ﬂows highly sensitive to state-to-state political interactions. Anderson
and Marcouiller (2002) explain that international trade is volatile because it consists
of cross-border transactions that are exposed to various risks. Consequently, any
act of uncertainty or imperfect contract enforcement may produce dramatic negative
consequences for trade between any two countries. Such uncertainty can emanate
from threats of economic sanctions which can make commercial enforcement of in-
ternational agreements diﬃcult as much as actual (imposed) sanctions. For instance,
Morrow et al. (1998) highlight the exposure of international ﬁrms to political risk
of their assets or products being conﬁscated, to credit risk exposing exporters or
importers non-payment because of limitations imposed on ﬁnancial transfers.
The focus of our study thus ﬁlls an apparent gap in three ways. First, we will be
the ﬁrst to empirically address how the threat of sanctions aﬀects international trade
using a more detailed cross-country analysis. This provides a unique opportunity to
explore theories within international political economy as to how sensitive trade is to
a mere threat of sanctions compared to the actual imposition of sanctions. Secondly,
a focus on diﬀerent sanctions instruments at a more disaggregated level provides a
new perspective in the sanctions literature, and oﬀers knowledge of the eﬀect of each
instrument and how to apply them eﬃciently. This is relevant given the increasing de-
bate about sanctions being regarded as a double-edged sword that cannot distinguish
innocent civilians from political leaders. Thus, identifying how these diﬀerent instru-
ments aﬀect international trade will improve the ability of diﬀerent actors to apply
them. Lastly, a product-level analysis also provides new insights as to how the impo-
sition of sanctions restricts the ﬂow of diﬀerent product categories. This is relevant as
the Geneva Convention has speciﬁc provision for the unrestricted passage of products
essential for human survival even in sanctioned states. Understanding which product
categories are aﬀected will provide information about the consequences of sanctions
on diﬀerent segments of the population, especially the civilian population.
In summary, our results show the impact of threatened sanctions diﬀers qualita-
tively and quantitatively from that of imposed sanctions. Whereas imposed sanctions
lead to a decrease in the trade ﬂow between the sender and the target, threatened
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sanctions lead to an increase in the trade ﬂow. The positive impact of the threat may
be due to economic agents in both the sender and its target resorting to stockpiling
prior to the actual imposition of sanctions to minimize any adverse consequences of
the sanctions. In addition, we ﬁnd varying eﬀects for diﬀerent sanctions instruments
and detrimental eﬀect of sanctions extended to essential products.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides possible theoretical
arguments on how threatened and imposed sanctions aﬀect bilateral trade between
the sender and its target, and on the basis of this formulates hypotheses. Section 3
presents the empirical strategy, econometric methods and data. Section 4 provides
the empirical results with discussions and Section 5 concludes the study.
2 Theoretical argument and hypotheses
International political economy emphasizes the importance of political/diplomatic
relations in the determination of trade ﬂows among states (see for example, Fuchs and
Klann (2013); Heilmann (2016); Morrow et al. (1998); Nitsch (2007); Rose (2007)).
However, if this political relationship becomes strained, it can negatively aﬀect the
trade ﬂow. Morrow et al. (1998) argue that increasing political or diplomatic tensions
among states increases the risk of trade disruption between states, in that, the more
likely the political tensions, the more proﬁtable trade must be to compensate for the
risk of disruption. In addition, they argue that this risk premium also increases even
with the anticipation of political tensions between states. A recent study by Fuchs
and Klann (2013) conﬁrms the trade-deteriorating eﬀect of diplomatic tensions, even
without explicit conﬂict or economic sanctions between the states. Empirically, they
show that countries that received the Dalai Lama suﬀered a slump in bilateral trade
with China although the Chinese government did not explicitly impose any trade
sanctions, but only threatened to impose sanctions on any country that received the
Dalai Lama. Brooks (2002) argues strongly that the threat of sanctions is suﬃcient to
exert negative consequences on the target even when the sender only issues a threat
which may or may not be imposed.
The eﬀect of anticipation of sanctions on trade may be inﬂuenced by the reaction
of ﬁrms and consumers to any signal of threat. To a large extent, ﬁrms that engage
in international trade do not only make strategic decisions on the basis of intrinsic
value as measured by price, quantity and quality of goods and services but also impor-
tantly, on the basis of the political risks associated with trade and its ﬁnance (Fuchs
& Klann, 2013). These political risks are important determining factors for ﬁrms as
international trade is not a cash and carry transaction but involves longer processes
and takes time as products move across borders. One example of how political risks
emanating from strained political relations could hinder international trade would be
the inability of trading partners to pay for goods shipped to them because of a ban on
ﬁnancial transfers as a result of economic sanctions. Sanctions may create a funda-
mental problem of exchange, especially when goods are in a transit without adequate
assurance that the letter of credit will be honored when the delivery conditions are
met. Thus, a risk-averse exporter will be hesitant to ship products to an importer
when there are possible threats or an anticipation that sanctions will be imposed on
the importer country.
Conversely, the anticipation of sanctions could also trigger stockpiling especially
in the short-run when changing suppliers of raw material, intermediate or ﬁnal prod-
ucts may be more costly. This is important when sunk costs are estimated to be
substantial and hence play a pivotal role in the exporting or importing decisions of
ﬁrms (Bernard & Jensen, 2004; Roberts & Tybout, 1997). The literature on the
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trade cost of a threat or anticipation of sanctions only pinpoints to the negative ef-
fects. The majority of studies conclude that the anticipation of sanctions can produce
negative consequences for trade (see for example, Anderson and Marcouiller (2002);
Morrow et al. (1998)). However, the sunk costs of exporting and importing are ma-
jor determinants of whether a ﬁrm will enter foreign market. The sunk costs may
include market information and search costs, the ﬁxed costs of adjusting products
to a country's standards or preferences. Overall, these sunk costs may deter a ﬁrm
from immediately deciding to change its suppliers because of impending restrictions
on trade or ﬁnance. Rational expectation theory predicts that prior expectation of
risks minimizes the loss agents are likely to suﬀer because of the possibility of prior
commitments. In the short term, ﬁrms may resort to stockpiling as one of the prior
commitment mechanisms in the face of possible threats from senders. By and large,
the anticipation of sanctions may make exporting/importing ﬁrms react ex ante by
building stockpiles, especially when immediate changes to suppliers would be more
expensive.
Similarly, basic consumer theory also indicates tastes and preferences as key de-
terminants of demand. Thus, consumers are reluctant to change their preferences in
the short-run, and hence, they are more likely to resort to stockpiling of consumer
goods in order to maintain the same level of satisfaction. Thus, the signiﬁcant sunk
costs for ﬁrms and sticky tastes and preferences of consumers could lead to a positive
eﬀect of a threat of sanctions on bilateral trade. There is evidence of stockpiling by
some targeted states as a way of minimizing the negative consequences of sanctions in
the future. Thus, it is theoretically plausible that a threat of sanctions could result in
increased trade between a sender and its target before sanctions are imposed. Davis
and Meunier (2011) allude to such evidence in two cases: when there were rising po-
litical tensions between the US and France (over the invasion of Iraq) and China and
Japan (over territorial and historical disputes). They indicate that even in the face of
intense political hostilities, trade and investment ﬂows between these countries were
still high, and this was mainly attributed to sunk costs that governments, ﬁrms and
consumers would have incurred if they had changed their behavior.
This therefore leads to our ﬁrst hypothesis which compares the impact of threat-
ened and imposed sanctions on international trade to determine whether the eﬀects
are qualitatively and quantitatively diﬀerent.
Hypothesis 1: The threat of sanctions produces trade-deteriorating eﬀects com-
parable to actual sanctions.
If a threat of sanctions is to have any signiﬁcant eﬀect or change the behavior of
international ﬁrms, then the threat must be credible enough to produce changes in
the behavior of exporters and importers. Credibility of the threat would depend to a
large extent on the entity from which the threat is emanating as well as the ability to
enforce the sanctions, i.e., credibility would depend on the authority of the entity to
command and enforce the sanctions. For example, Fuchs and Klann (2013) indicate
that trade-deteriorating eﬀects with China for receiving the Dalai Lama is inﬂuenced
by the rank of the political leader that met the Dalai Lama. A threat of sanctions
may be issued by diﬀerent entities such as the executive or government, legislature,
state organizations, etc. The ranks of government functionaries carry diﬀerent degree
of authority and hence diﬀerent credibility.
Since we are considering the eﬀect on international trade, the proximity of the
threat-issuing entity to exporters or importers should also matter. Various exporter
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and importer associations regularly hold meetings where foreign service and trade-
related agencies are invited. Generally, threats emanating from such institutions as
Ministries of Trade and Industry, Ministries of Finance and Commerce, Ministries
of Foreign Aﬀairs and Customs Agencies should be taken seriously by exporters or
importers as they are mostly the implementing and enforcing agencies. This indicates
that threats from institutions in closer contact with traders may be more credible and
will lead to stronger prior adjustments to minimize the cost of sanctions when they
are imposed. Thus, our second hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 2: The eﬀect of the threat of sanctions on trade will depend on the
ranks of the oﬃcials issuing the threat.
Diﬀerent senders employ diﬀerent sanctions instruments. Hufbauer et al. (2007)
explain that diﬀerent types of sanctions have diﬀerent eﬀects in several ways. They
argue that trade sanctions may have a limited impact compared to ﬁnancial sanc-
tions since the disruption of ﬁnancial ﬂows may also disrupt international trade even
without any explicit trade sanctions. In addition, trade controls may be applied to
selective products because the Geneva Convention prohibits the banning of essential
goods such as food and medicine. Unlike ﬁnancial sanctions, trade sanctions may be
diﬃcult to enforce and thus it is possible for target states to easily circumvent the
ban.
The diﬀerent eﬀects of various instruments may not necessarily be limited to the
broad categories of ﬁnancial and trade instruments. Within trade sanctions, there
could be import bans or export embargoes and these can aﬀect the trade ﬂows be-
tween the sender and the target diﬀerently. Similarly, there are various ﬁnancial
sanction instruments such as cutting of ﬁnancial aid, capital ﬂows, bank lending and
access to SWIFT. These diﬀerent instruments can produce diﬀerential eﬀects on in-
ternational trade. In addition, there is also growing concern about the use of smart
sanctions. This involves the use of asset freezes and travel bans, mostly targeted at
political and economic elites in target states. Hufbauer et al. (2007) argue that these
so-called smart sanctions can easily be circumvented as they require detailed private
information about individuals. Thus, our second hypothesis tests the eﬀect of diﬀer-
ent instruments at a more disaggregated level.
Hypothesis 3: The trade eﬀect of sanctions depends on the diﬀerent instruments
employed.
Knowledge of the trade eﬀects of sanctions at the disaggregated product level is
relevant especially as previous studies ﬁnd that sanctions against Cuba and Iraq con-
tributed to falls in nutritional value, increases in infectious diseases and increased
infant and under-ﬁve mortality (Ali & Shah, 2000; Garﬁeld & Santana, 1997). This
indirectly indicates that the imposition of sanctions on these target states aﬀected
supplies of essential goods (food and medicines). More speciﬁcally, Gibbons and
Garﬁeld (1999) ﬁnd that sanctions on Haiti led to an acute shortage of essential
goods and this resulted in astronomical increases in the prices of medicines, vaccines,
and baby formula. Trade embargoes on essential goods for human survival associated
with sanctions can have adverse re-distributive and welfare eﬀects. Constraints on
essential goods are de jure not expected on the basis of the Geneva Convention. Ac-
cording to this convention, any trade-restricting eﬀect of sanctions should not aﬀect
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the passage of essential goods such as food and medicines. Thus, our third hypothesis
tests whether the imposition of sanctions aﬀects essential products.
Hypothesis 4: The trade-deteriorating eﬀect of sanctions does not aﬀect essen-
tial goods.
3 Data and Empirical Strategy
3.1 Data
To test whether threats of sanctions made by governments or their functionaries have
any trade-reducing eﬀects comparable to actual sanctions, we use the TIES data by
Morgan et al. (2014) to generate a dyadic sender-target and year-speciﬁc observations.
Because of the dyadic nature of the analysis, we only focus on sanction episodes
involving a primary sender state and its main target state. Hence, we do not cover
multilateral sanctions threatened or imposed by multilateral organizations such as the
European Union (EU) or the United Nations (UN). Tables A and B in Appendices
1 and 2 show the list of sender and target states. For developed sender states, apart
from the US, which is a dominant sender, there are other developed countries such
as Canada, Germany and the United Kingdom that jointly account for about 20%
of total episodes of sanctions. In addition, there are also emerging and developing
countries such as China, India, Saudi Arabia and Mexico that individually account
for over 2% of total sanction cases. Among the target states, the US is also the most
frequent target of sanctions.
TIES deﬁnes sanctions as actions that a sender takes to limit or end economic
relations with a target in an eﬀort to persuade the target state to change its objec-
tionable policies. Our empirical sample examines cases of sanction which involve two
countries, a primary sender and its target. In total, the sanctions considered in the
analysis include 1153 cases involving 60 senders and 143 targets spanning the period
1960 to 2009. The matrix for the sanction cases comprises of 379 cases (33%) in which
sanctions were threatened without any explicit imposition, 279 cases (24%) in which
sanctions were imposed without threats and 495 cases (43%) in which sanctions were
threatened and imposed at the same time.
Actual sanctions involve the use of several instruments such as the imposition of
tariﬀs, export controls, import restrictions, travel bans, the freezing of assets and
ﬁnancial transfer bans, while threats involve the same instruments but ultimately
they are not employed. This data source provides comprehensive information on the
speciﬁc instruments used by a particular sender on a targeted state. The TIES data
constitutes an improvement over previously used data sets, such as the Hufbauer
et al. (2007) database, as it provides in-depth information on more countries and
has a longer time series. This data comprises developed and developing nations as
both sender and target states, thus providing an opportunity to derive the eﬀects of
sanction on trade in a broad and general setting which is not driven by a speciﬁc
country or group. This is relevant because previous papers focus predominantly on
US sanctions.
In measuring international trade, we extend the analysis from trade at aggregated
level to diﬀerent product categories. We diﬀerentiate between the sanction eﬀects
using exports and imports. We use aggregated trade ﬂows from the IMF direction of
trade statistics (DOTs). Data on the disaggregated trade ﬂows is obtained from the
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UN Comtrade database, which uses the Standard International Trade Classiﬁcation
(SITC). This disaggregation allows us to examine whether sanctions adversely aﬀect
trade of essential goods. This provides information on trade ﬂows both at disaggre-
gated level from 1962 to 2014 and hence, suitable to identify the product categories
most aﬀected by sanctions. The data from all these diﬀerent sources are merged into
a comprehensive panel data set.
Apart from the sanction variables, we also include the standard set of control-
ling variables in the gravity model, all sourced from CEPII. These include indicator
variables that take one or zero otherwise if the sender and the target share mem-
bership in a regional trade agreement (RTA) or WTO/GATT, have a colonial tie,
share a common border or a common currency. We use the dichotomous Democracy
and Dictatorship (DD) database developed by Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010)
to control for political regime types. Yu (2010) indicates that the political regimes
of trading partners greatly aﬀect the trade ﬂow between them. The DD employs a
minimalist approach and classiﬁes political regimes either as democratic or autocratic
(dictatorships). Descriptive statistics on the main variables are provided in Appendix
3.
3.2 Empirical Strategy
In terms of the empirical strategy, we employ the gravity model, which is a conven-
tional framework for analyzing the determinants of trade ﬂow. This empirical model
assumes that the trade ﬂow between two countries is determined by supply potential
(exporter GDP), market demand potential (importer GDP) and trade cost (trans-
port). Using regression analysis, the gravity model is augmented with the baseline
variables of interest ( imposed and threatened sanctions) as additional determinants
of trade ﬂow between the sender and the target. Sanctions are coded as indicator
variables distinguishing between cases when they are threatened or imposed. Thus,
we have our baseline econometric model as follows, in line with Anderson and van
Wincoop (2003):
lnXij = αo + αij + αt + β1Mit + β2Mjt + β3Dijt + γi(j)tthreats
+δijimpositions+ (1− σ)(MRTijt) + ijt (1)
αij and αt are dyadic country ﬁxed and time eﬀects. We include country ﬁxed eﬀects
to control for unobserved time-invariant variables and time eﬀects to control for any global
trends. Mi(j)t are monadic variables for the exporter (importer) such as GDP, population,
geographical area and political regime. Dijt are dyadic variables such as distance, common
language, common currency, colonial tie, border, RTA and WTO. MRT is the multilateral
resistance term. We control for the MRT by using the Baier and Bergstrand (2009) proxy.
These authors derive MRT from a ﬁrst-order log-linear Taylor expansion which yields an
empirical reduced form equation as follows:
MRTijt =
1
N
[
N∑
i
θitln(Tijt) +
N∑
j
θjtln(Tijt)−
N∑
k=1
N∑
m=1
θktθmtln(Tkmt)] (2)
This measure is the simple average of multilateral relative to world trade costs (Tijt),
where Tijt is replaced with observable trade costs such as distance, common language, colo-
nial ties etc. This approach has been used in recent studies by Egger and Nelson (2011),
Hoekman and Nicita (2011) and Berger, Easterly, Nunn, and Satyanath (2013). Previous
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research that study the eﬀect of sanctions on international did not control for MRT. Ander-
son and van Wincoop (2003) emphasize the importance of controlling for this, as otherwise
the gravity model would produce inconsistent results.
There is also a primary concern of endogeneity emanating from reverse causality between
trade and sanctions in that sanctions are more likely to be imposed on targets that have
experienced a dip in trade with the sender. To minimize any potential bias from such endo-
geneity, we lag our variables of interest and also use the approach adopted by Berger et al.
(2013). They use a dummy variable to control for the window of years before an intervention
(in our case sanctions). Neuenkirch and Neumeier (2015) also use a similar approach when
they argue that endogeneity may arise from the fact that the institutional, political and so-
cial environments may not be comparable during periods with and without sanctions. Thus,
any impact on trade in sanction periods could be as result of that environment. In their
approach, they restrict the control sample to a window of years before and after sanctions.
This window of years around the sanction period makes factors such as the institutional,
political, and social environment more comparable in order to derive an unbiased treatment
eﬀect. We adopt these various approaches to minimize any potential endogeneity.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Comparison between threatened sanctions and imposed
sanctions
Table 1 reports our baseline results testing the hypothesis that the eﬀect of threatened
sanctions on bilateral trade is similar to actual imposed sanctions. Our results diﬀerentiate
between the three cases of sanctions: (1) when sanctions are threatened without any ex-
plicit imposition, (2) when sanctions are threatened and imposed, and (3) when sanctions
are imposed without threats. The results indicate that the eﬀect of threatened sanctions is
qualitatively and quantitatively diﬀerent from that of imposed sanctions. Whereas the im-
position of sanctions (with or without a threat) has a large economic and statistical adverse
eﬀect by reducing bilateral trade ranging from 16% [exp(−0.179)−1] to 32% [exp(−0.387)−1]
on average between the sender and target in sanction periods, threatened sanctions have a
positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect of 17% to 29% on bilateral trade. In addition, the distributed
lags for imposed sanctions also show strong persistence, although the magnitude of the co-
eﬃcients declines in subsequent periods compared to the ﬁrst period. Focusing on imposed
sanctions, although there seems to be no major quantitative diﬀerence on exports when
sanctions are imposed with or without threats. We also realize a less pronounced adverse
eﬀect on imports when there is a threat before actual imposition.
[Insert Table 1 here]
This may indicate that issuing a threat can actually undermine the eﬃcacy of sanctions
as the target may devise strategies to counteract any adverse eﬀect when the sanctions are
subsequently imposed. This is consistent with van Bergeijk (2009) argument that threat-
ening without immediate imposition can allow targets to react by stockpiling or by other
policies aimed at reducing their vulnerability to foreign economic pressure. As recently as
2012, it was reported that in the face of impending sanctions on Iran because of its nu-
clear enrichment ambitions, Tehran tremendously increased the import of wheat to 7 million
tonnes from the world markets and about 1.8 million tonnes from the US (a principal sender
of sanctions on Iran).2.
For threats of sanctions without subsequent imposition, we see a large economic and sta-
tistical signiﬁcant eﬀect on exports compared to imports. A plausible explanation may relate
to the credibility of the threat emanating from the greater ﬂexibility with which sanctions
can impede exports compared to imports. This therefore creates relatively more uncertainty
2Reported by Reuters on March 16th, 2012. http://www.reuters.com/article/usa-wheat-iran-
idUSL2E8EF9UU20120316
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for exporters than importers as threats can easily be implemented at any time by the gov-
ernment or institutions in the sender states. Thus, exporters may act more rapidly when
there is a threat. With a threat of sanctions to restrict imports, it may take a longer time.
Hufbauer et al. (2007) explain that sanctions can more easily be imposed on exports than
on imports. They attribute this to a strict regulation of imports, especially by international
trade agreements and international organizations. For instance, the WTO can hinder a swift
imposition of sanctions on imports. The positive eﬀect of a threat of sanctions may be a
sign that it can trigger stockpiling by domestic ﬁrms especially in sender states that rely
on products from target states. The adverse eﬀect of actually imposed sanctions can also
be minimized when there are explicit threats before actual impositions. van Bergeijk (2009)
argues that economic agents that will be negatively aﬀected will take measures at the threat
stage to minimize such adverse eﬀects. Our results conﬁrm this occurrence in the case of
imports. The trade-deteriorating eﬀect of imposed sanctions is signiﬁcantly lower when there
was an explicit threat prior to the actual imposition of sanctions.
[Insert Table 2 here]
Since we only see a more signiﬁcant eﬀect of threats of sanctions on exports, we test our
second hypothesis by examining whether the positive eﬀect of threats of sanctions is quan-
titatively diﬀerent when threats are issued by diﬀerent entities in the sender states. We
categorized the issuing authorities into four main groups. These are (1) threats by govern-
ments when they are issued by a member of the state executive's staﬀ, a state executive
such as the President, the Prime Minister, the Chancellor or the government; (2) the threat
is considered to emanate from the legislature and is made by a member or committee on
the ﬂoor of parliament; (3) when the threat comes from state institutions or bureaucracies
that handle issues related to international diplomacy, international trade and international
security; and (4) when the threat is issued by heads of international organizations or by an
organization that is mainly funded and controlled by the state (e.g. United States or United
Kingdom Agency for International Development). Our results are reported in Table 2 and we
ﬁnd that the eﬀect of threats emanating from trade and foreign service-related organization
is more pronounced. Threats emanating from the government and the legislature are also
strongly signiﬁcant in contrast to those from state-funded organizations (eg. USAID). This
indicates that reaction from economic agents may depend to a large extent on the source of
the threat and therefore the credibility of the threat matters.
Turning to the core gravity model control variables, we ﬁnd that the GDPs of both the
sender and target are signiﬁcant determinants of bilateral trade. The standard gravity model
control variables have the expected signs and the size of the co-eﬃcients are within a plausi-
ble range. In addition, membership of RTAs and the WTO are also signiﬁcant determinants.
All these results are in line with conventional expectations in gravity model estimations. We
also ﬁnd the democracy indicator variables for both the sender and the target are positive
but not signiﬁcant. The results for all the control variables and the multilateral resistance
terms (MRT) are reported in Table 2A in Appendix 4. The multilateral resistance coeﬃ-
cients for various measures of trade costs are also comparable to those in studies such as
Egger and Nelson (2011), Hoekman and Nicita (2011) and Berger et al. (2013) that use the
Baier and Bergstrand's (2009)proxy.
[Insert Table 3 here]
To gain a better understanding of how trade ﬂows react to the threat or imposition of
diﬀerent sanction instruments, we test our hypothesis 3 and the results are reported in Ta-
ble 3. Notably, we see that the threat of import restrictions by a sender has a positive and
signiﬁcant eﬀect on bilateral trade, as indicated in columns (1) and (2). Our results show
that the positive anticipation eﬀect of a threat is greatly inﬂuenced when a sender imposes
import restrictions on goods from the target. This eﬀect is two-way, as we see a signiﬁcant
eﬀect on both exports and imports. Speciﬁcally, the results indicate that threats of import
restrictions lead to an increase in trade between 28% and 34%. Similarly, we ﬁnd that the
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threat of foreign aid being cut by senders signiﬁcantly increases exports from the sender to
the target. This is not surprising for two main reasons. First, foreign aid allocations are tied
to donors' strategic interests. One of such interests involves using foreign aid to promote
the exports of the donors'domestic ﬁrms (Alesina & Dollar, 2000). When donors choose to
ﬁnance development projects that require supplies from their domestic ﬁrms. Thus, foreign
aid increases trade between the donor and the recipient (Hühne, Meyer, & Nunnenkamp,
2014). Second, a threat of termination of foreign aid can be implemented easily and immedi-
ately. We also see this positive eﬀect for other instruments such as total economic embargoes,
economic blockages, asset freezes and travel bans but they are not statistically signiﬁcant.
Focusing on the eﬀect of the diﬀerent instruments employed in actual impositions of
sanctions shows that although, qualitatively similar (in terms of the sign of the coeﬃcients)
they are quantitatively diﬀerent (in terms of the size and signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients).
The results in columns (3) and (4) show that comprehensive sanctions like total economic
embargoes, where the sender stops the ﬂow of all economic exchanges with the target have
the most drastic eﬀect in decreasing the trade ﬂow between them. This applies to the two-
way ﬂows between them. On average, they reduce exports by 80% and imports by 91%. We
also ﬁnd that when foreign aid has actually been terminated, it also signiﬁcantly reduces
trade ﬂow between the sender and the target. Surprisingly, the results show that although
the eﬀects of export and import restrictions are negative, they are statistically insigniﬁcant.
However, this may be a sign that trade sanctions on their own may not signiﬁcantly reduce
trade ﬂows unless they are complemented with ﬁnancial sanctions.
[Insert Table 4 here]
We now examine whether there is any heterogeneous eﬀect of sanctions on diﬀerent SITC
product classiﬁcations. Our main focus is on essential goods, which includes food and animal
products and medicinal and pharmaceutical products. If these product categories are less
adversely aﬀected, then the sanction damage be may less, especially for the poor civilian
population. In columns 1-3 of Table 4, we ﬁrst look at the impact of sanctions on exports
from sender to target states. The results show that imposed sanctions without any explicit
threat adversely aﬀect exports of essential products from the sender to the target. The
adverse eﬀect is more pronounced in terms of the size and signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient for
food and animal products compared to medicinal and pharmaceutical products. In contrast,
we do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects on imports of essential products from the targets. This
points to the fact that target states are the ones that have limited access to these essential
products. Hufbauer et al. (2007) argue that most senders are relatively more developed and,
thus have more industrial capacity in the production of these essential products. Targets
tend to be more dependent on senders for supplies of these essential commodities. This may
explain why many studies ﬁnd detrimental consequences for target states such as increases
in malnutrition, infectious disease and infant mortality.
4.2 Robustness
4.2.1 Endogeneity concerns
A primary concern in our baseline estimation is endogeneity arising from diﬀerent sources.
One of the sources is omitted variable bias. Omitted variable bias may not be a serious
concern as our baseline equation controls for both country-pair time invariant factors as well
as an exhaustive set of time-varying variables. However, reverse causality is a potential source
of endogeneity, in particular when senders impose or threaten sanctions on targets when the
trade ﬂow is already low. For instance, Jing, Kaempfer, and Lowenberg (2003) indicate that
the choice of sanctions instrument is endogenous to the political process and policy outcomes
sought by the sender. In a speciﬁc case of sanctions, Neuenkirch and Neumeier (2015) also
argue that the imposition of sanctions might be a consequence of an environment that is
regarded as bad by the sender and that the negative eﬀect of the sanctions variable might
be the direct negative eﬀect of the targets' own policies. In such cases, the recommended
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standard approach is the use of instrumental variables in a two-stage regression. However,
for the cases of dyadic variables, the appropriate and valid instruments are diﬃcult to ﬁnd.
Thus, we rely on other econometric methods that can equally produce consistent results in
the face of possible endogeneity.
To minimize such potential endogeneity we use three approaches. In the ﬁrst approach,
we use the method employed by Berger et al. (2013) who show that sender interventions (
In their case, the US Central Intelligence Agency) are more common in countries, when the
country has experienced a preceding decline in its imports of the senders' products. To min-
imize this source of endogeneity, they control for a pre-intervention dip by using an indicator
variable that equals one if the observation is within a 5-year window around the sanction
period (both before and after the year in which the sanctions were threatened or imposed).
In a second approach, we resort to ﬁrst-diﬀerencing (FD) of our baseline equation. Baier
and Bergstrand (2007) argue that FD data provide better estimates of the average treatment
eﬀect. In addition, it has other advantages as it can control for serial correlation, possible
unit-root trends and also potentially spurious regressions. Clemens, Radelet, Bhavnani, and
Bazzi (2012) identify FD as way of controlling for reverse causality and suggest it is more
transparent and eﬃcient than using weak instruments. In a last approach we use a two-step
system GMM estimator, in which the lagged values of the possible endogenous variables
are used as instruments. This approach also corrects for mean-reverting dynamics or path
dependence which often characterizes trade relationships, by including the lagged value of
the dependent variable as covariates. Fuchs and Klann (2013) use the same approach. In
this approach we treat threats and impositions of sanctions as endogenous variables and set
the maximum number of lags to ﬁve in order to restrict the moment conditions.
[Insert Table 5 here]
Table 5 reports our estimates when these diﬀerent approaches are used to reduce any poten-
tial endogeneity. Columns (1) and (2) show the results when we use the dummy variable to
control for a window of ﬁve years around the sanction periods. Our results remain consistent
and the coeﬃcients are economically and statistically signiﬁcant. We realize that using this
approach has also improved the signiﬁcance of the threat of sanctions on imports from the
targets. Now, we see the positive eﬀect is signifcant at conventional level of 5%. Columns
(3) and (4) of Table 5 also report the results when we use the ﬁrst-diﬀerencing approach.
Our results remain signiﬁcant but the magnitude of the coeﬃcient becomes less pronounced.
However, they are still economically signiﬁcant. In the GMM estimation, we specify the
main variables of interest (threat and imposition) as endogenous variables and also include
the ﬁrst lag of the dependent variables as additional explanatory variables. The results are
shown in columns (5) and (6) of Table 5. The coeﬃcients for lagged exports and imports
are positive and strongly signiﬁcant. The GMM coeﬃcients for the sanction variables are
reported with the tests for over-identiﬁcation (Hansen J test) and autocorrelation, show-
ing no sign of misspeciﬁcation. These coeﬃcients remain robust when we use the dynamic
estimation method.
5 Conclusion
Although there are increasing numbers of both theoretical and empirical studies on sanctions,
they are mostly restricted to the actual imposition of sanctions. The majority of these
studies limit their analysis to the sanction period and do not cover the period prior to the
imposition of the sanctions. Thus, there is a limited number of studies that analyze the
economic implications of a threat of sanctions. This gap in the literature can be explained
by the fact that there used to be no detailed compilation of sanction cases that diﬀerentiated
between threats and actual impositions. Thus, we know little about what transpire between
the sender and its target in terms of dyadic trade at the stage when sanctions are threatened.
However, with the recent introduction of the Threat and Imposition of Economic sanctions
database by Morgan et al. (2014) this gap can now be adequately addressed.
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This paper has provided the ﬁrst empirical analysis comparing the eﬀect on bilateral
trade of threatened sanctions to that of imposed sanctions. It provides evidence that the
threat stage has important consequences for international trade between the sender and its
target. More precisely, the empirical results show that the impact of the threat of sanctions
is qualitatively and quantitatively diﬀerent from the actual imposition of sanctions. Whereas
the threat of sanctions has positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the bilateral trade ﬂow between
the sender and its target, the actual imposition of sanctions has a negative and signiﬁcant
eﬀect. However, we only see a strongly signiﬁcant positive eﬀect of a threat of sanctions
on exports. This is plausible as senders have greater ﬂexibility in imposing sanctions on
exports compared to imports. The economic signiﬁcance of the magnitude of the eﬀect also
appears to decline over time. The positive eﬀect of a threat of sanctions is aligned with the
theoretical argument of van Bergeijk (2009) that the time dimension gives the agents both
within the sender and target economies the ability to react by stockpiling or by adopting
other strategies that can minimize the economic pressure of the sanctions.
For economic agents to adjust or adopt countervailing measures at the threat stage,
the threat must be credible enough for the agents to react instantaneously or before the
actual imposition. Thus, the paper has also analyzed whether diﬀerent sources of threats
play any signiﬁcant role in the positive impact of sanctions on exports. The results show
that threats emanating from foreign service and trade-oriented institutions have a more
pronounced positive impact. This may be because of the proximity of these institutions to
exporter and importer associations and hence threats from them may be considered more
likely to be imposed.
Turning to the heterogeneous eﬀect of sanctions, ﬁrst, we examined the eﬀects of diﬀerent
sanction instruments when imposed by the senders. Our results show that total economic
embargoes have the most drastic impact on the trade ﬂow between the sender and the
target. In addition, foreign aid cuts also have adverse eﬀect on the bilateral trade between
the sender and its target. Examining sanctions instruments that are construed as smart
sanctions, such as asset freezes and travel bans, show that they do not have a discernible
eﬀect. Second, we also examined the heterogeneous eﬀects of sanctions on diﬀerent product
categories. The results are in line with the common ﬁnding that the imposition of sanctions
contributes to high malnutrition, infant mortality and increases in the incidence of infectious
diseases. Our results conﬁrm that essential products such as food and medical supplies are
also adversely aﬀected. This adverse eﬀect on these essential products only applies to exports
from senders. This makes sense as the senders of sanctions are mostly relatively developed
and have superior technologies in the production of such essential products.
A major implication from this paper is the result that threat before the actual imposition
of sanctions can undermine the eﬀectiveness of sanctions. The passage of time between the
threat and the actual imposition can give economic agents time to adopt strategies ex ante
that can minimize any negative eﬀect the imposition will eventually have on them. The time
dynamic is relevant in determining the eﬀectiveness of sanctions because there is consensus
that sanctions that span longer periods are less successful. This is mainly because the passage
of time gives space for agents aﬀected negatively to adopt strategies that can mitigate the
economic costs of the sanctions. A possible instrument available to exporters and importers
in both sender and target states to minimize future adverse eﬀects is stockpiling. Stockpiling
is a common phenomenon in the international trade of crude oil when agents anticipate
unfavorable occurrences such as price increases or shortages.
13
References
Afesorgbor, S. K., & Mahadevan, R. (2016). The impact of economic sanctions on
income inequality of target states. World Development , 83 , 111.
Alesina, A., & Dollar, D. (2000). Who gives foreign aid to whom and why? Journal
of Economic Growth, 5 (1), 3363.
Ali, M. M., & Shah, I. H. (2000). Sanctions and childhood mortality in iraq. The
Lancet , 355 (9218), 18511857.
Anderson, J. E., & Marcouiller, D. (2002). Insecurity and the pattern of trade: An
empirical investigation. Review of Economics and statistics, 84 (2), 342352.
Anderson, J. E., & van Wincoop, E. (2003). Gravity with gravitas: a solution to the
border puzzle. American Economic Review , 93 , 170192.
Baier, S. L., & Bergstrand, J. H. (2007). Do free trade agreements actually increase
members' international trade? Journal of International Economics, 71 (1), 72
 95.
Baier, S. L., & Bergstrand, J. H. (2009). Bonus vetus ols: A simple method for ap-
proximating international trade-cost eﬀects using the gravity equation. Journal
of International Economics, 77 (1), 7785.
Bapat, N. A., & Clifton Morgan, T. (2009). Multilateral versus unilateral sanctions
reconsidered: A test using new data. International Studies Quarterly , 53 (4),
10751094.
Berger, D., Easterly, W., Nunn, N., & Satyanath, S. (2013). Commercial imperialism?
Political inﬂuence and trade during the Cold War. American Economic Review ,
103 (2), 863896.
Bernard, A. B., & Jensen, J. B. (2004). Why some ﬁrms export. Review of Economics
and Statistics, 86 (2), 561569.
Brooks, R. A. (2002). Sanctions and regime type: What works, and when? Security
Studies, 11 (4), 150.
Caruso, R. (2003). The impact of international economic sanctions on trade: An
empirical analysis. Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy , 9 (2).
Cheibub, J. A., Gandhi, J., & Vreeland, J. R. (2010). Democracy and dictatorship
revisited. Public Choice, 143 (1-2), 67101.
Clemens, M. A., Radelet, S., Bhavnani, R. R., & Bazzi, S. (2012). Counting chickens
when they hatch: Timing and the eﬀects of aid on growth. The Economic
Journal , 122 (561), 590617.
Davis, C. L., & Meunier, S. (2011). Business as usual? Economic responses to political
tensions. American Journal of Political Science, 55 (3), 628646.
Eaton, J., & Engers, M. (1992). Sanctions. Journal of Political Economy , 100 (5),
899928.
Egger, P., & Nelson, D. (2011). How bad is antidumping? evidence from panel data.
Review of Economics and Statistics, 93 (4), 13741390.
Fuchs, A., & Klann, N.-H. (2013). Paying a visit: The dalai lama eﬀect on interna-
tional trade. Journal of International Economics, 91 (1), 164177.
Garﬁeld, R., & Santana, S. (1997). The impact of the economic crisis and the US
embargo on health in Cuba. American Journal of Public Health, 87 (1), 1520.
Gibbons, E., & Garﬁeld, R. (1999). The impact of economic sanctions on health and
human rights in Haiti, 1991-1994. American Journal of Public Health, 89 (10),
14991504.
Heilmann, K. (2016). Does political conﬂict hurt trade? Evidence from consumer
boycotts. Journal of International Economics, 99 , 179191.
Hoekman, B. M., & Leidy, M. P. (1989). Dumping, antidumping, and emergency
14
protection. Journal of World Trade, 23 (5), 2744.
Hoekman, B. M., & Nicita, A. (2011). Trade policy, trade costs, and developing
country trade. World Development , 39 (12), 20692079.
Hufbauer, G. C., Schott, J. J., Elliott, K. A., & Oegg, B. (2007). Economic sanctions
reconsidered (3rd ed.). Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International
Economics.
Hühne, P., Meyer, B., & Nunnenkamp, P. (2014). Who beneﬁts from aid for trade?
Comparing the eﬀects on recipient versus donor exports. The Journal of Devel-
opment Studies, 50 (9), 12751288.
Jing, C., Kaempfer, W. H., & Lowenberg, A. D. (2003). Instrument choice and the
eﬀectiveness of international sanctions: A simultaneous equations approach.
Journal of Peace Research, 40 (5), 519535.
Lacy, D., & Niou, E. (2004). A theory of economic sanctions and issue linkage: The
roles of preferences, information, and threats. Journal of Politics, 66 (1), 2542.
McLaren, J. (1997). Size, sunk costs, and Judge Bowker's objection to free trade.
The American Economic Review , 87 (3), 400420.
Morgan, T. C., Bapat, N., & Kobayashi, Y. (2014). Threat and imposition of economic
sanctions 19452005: Updating the TIES dataset. Conﬂict Management and
Peace Science, 118.
Morrow, J. D., Siverson, R. M., & Tabares, T. E. (1998). The political determinants
of international trade: the major powers, 19071990. American Political Science
Review , 92 (03), 649661.
Neuenkirch, M., & Neumeier, F. (2015). The impact of UN and US economic sanctions
on GDP growth. European Journal of Political Economy , 40 , 110125.
Neuenkirch, M., & Neumeier, F. (2016). The impact of US sanctions on poverty.
Journal of Development Economics, 121 , 110119.
Nitsch, V. (2007). State visits and international trade. The World Economy , 30 (12),
17971816.
Pape, R. A. (1997). Why economic sanctions do not work. International Security ,
22 (2), 90136.
Peksen, D., & Son, B. (2015). Economic coercion and currency crises in target
countries. Journal of Peace Research, 52 (4), 448462.
Roberts, M. J., & Tybout, J. R. (1997). The decision to export in Colombia: An
empirical model of entry with sunk costs. The American Economic Review ,
87 (4), 545564.
Rose, A. K. (2007). The foreign service and foreign trade: Embassies as export
promotion. The World Economy , 30 (1), 2238.
van Bergeijk, P. A. (1989). Success and failure of economic sanctions. Kyklos, 42 (3),
385404.
van Bergeijk, P. A. (1995). The impact of economic sanctions in the 1990s. The
World Economy , 18 (3), 443455.
van Bergeijk, P. A. (2009). Economic diplomacy and the geography of international
trade. Edward Elgar Publishing.
van Bergeijk, P. A., & van Marrewijk, C. (1995). Why do sanctions need time
to work? Adjustment, learning and anticipation. Economic Modelling , 12 (2),
7586.
Whang, T., McLean, E. V., & Kuberski, D. W. (2013). Coercion, information, and
the success of sanction threats. American journal of political science, 57 (1),
6581.
Yu, M. (2010). Trade, democracy, and the gravity equation. Journal of Development
Economics, 91 (2), 289300.
15
Appendix 1
Table A: List of sender states
Freq. Percent Valid Cum.
Valid Afghanistan 52 0.51 0.51 0.51
Argentina 28 0.28 0.28 0.79
Armenia, Republic of 14 0.14 0.14 0.93
Australia 120 1.18 1.18 2.11
Belarus 18 0.18 0.18 2.29
Brazil 69 0.68 0.68 2.97
Burundi 90 0.89 0.89 3.85
Cambodia 20 0.20 0.20 4.05
Canada 826 8.14 8.14 12.19
Central African Republic 18 0.18 0.18 12.37
Chad 20 0.20 0.20 12.57
Chile 27 0.27 0.27 12.83
China 221 2.18 2.18 15.01
Colombia 164 1.62 1.62 16.63
Denmark 19 0.19 0.19 16.81
Egypt 100 0.99 0.99 17.80
El Salvador 20 0.20 0.20 18.00
France 277 2.73 2.73 20.73
Germany 568 5.60 5.60 26.32
Ghana 15 0.15 0.15 26.47
Greece 142 1.40 1.40 27.87
Honduras 20 0.20 0.20 28.07
Hungary 17 0.17 0.17 28.23
India 382 3.76 3.76 32.00
Indonesia 167 1.65 1.65 33.65
Iran 151 1.49 1.49 35.13
Iraq 106 1.04 1.04 36.18
Israel 21 0.21 0.21 36.39
Italy 52 0.51 0.51 36.90
Jamaica 43 0.42 0.42 37.32
Japan 145 1.43 1.43 38.75
Kazakhstan 51 0.50 0.50 39.25
Kenya 21 0.21 0.21 39.46
Korea, Republic of 75 0.74 0.74 40.20
Kuwait 56 0.55 0.55 40.75
Libya 42 0.41 0.41 41.16
Malaysia 21 0.21 0.21 41.37
Malta 168 1.66 1.66 43.03
Mexico 217 2.14 2.14 45.17
Netherlands 11 0.11 0.11 45.27
New Zealand 35 0.34 0.34 45.62
Nigeria 43 0.42 0.42 46.04
Pakistan 12 0.12 0.12 46.16
Philippines 16 0.16 0.16 46.32
Russian Federation 99 0.98 0.98 47.29
Saudi Arabia 247 2.43 2.43 49.73
Singapore 59 0.58 0.58 50.31
Spain 67 0.66 0.66 50.97
Sudan 21 0.21 0.21 51.18
Sweden 21 0.21 0.21 51.38
Syrian Arab Republic 114 1.12 1.12 52.51
Tanzania 24 0.24 0.24 52.74
Thailand 47 0.46 0.46 53.21
Turkey 76 0.75 0.75 53.96
Ukraine 18 0.18 0.18 54.13
United Kingdom 593 5.84 5.84 59.98
United States 4014 39.56 39.56 99.54
Venezuela 12 0.12 0.12 99.66
Zambia 24 0.24 0.24 99.89
Zimbabwe 11 0.11 0.11 100.00
Total 10147 100.00 100.00
16
Appendix 2
Table B: List of target states
Freq. Percent Valid Cum.
Valid Afghanistan 53 0.52 0.52 0.52
Albania 56 0.55 0.55 1.07
Algeria 52 0.51 0.51 1.59
Antigua and Barbuda 19 0.19 0.19 1.77
Argentina 180 1.77 1.77 3.55
Australia 154 1.52 1.52 5.07
Austria 57 0.56 0.56 5.63
Azerbaijan 32 0.32 0.32 5.94
Bangladesh 44 0.43 0.43 6.38
Barbados 18 0.18 0.18 6.55
Belarus 18 0.18 0.18 6.73
Belgium 25 0.25 0.25 6.98
Belize 24 0.24 0.24 7.21
Benin 19 0.19 0.19 7.40
Bolivia 42 0.41 0.41 7.82
Bosnia and Herzegovina 34 0.34 0.34 8.15
Botswana 18 0.18 0.18 8.33
Brazil 169 1.67 1.67 9.99
Bulgaria 32 0.32 0.32 10.31
Burkina Faso 40 0.39 0.39 10.70
Burundi 45 0.44 0.44 11.15
Cambodia 66 0.65 0.65 11.80
Canada 249 2.45 2.45 14.25
Central African Republic 39 0.38 0.38 14.63
Chad 18 0.18 0.18 14.81
Chile 115 1.13 1.13 15.95
China 234 2.31 2.31 18.25
Colombia 36 0.35 0.35 18.61
Congo, Republic of 16 0.16 0.16 18.76
Costa Rica 28 0.28 0.28 19.04
Cote d'Ivoire 36 0.35 0.35 19.39
Croatia 34 0.34 0.34 19.73
Cuba 50 0.49 0.49 20.22
Cyprus 18 0.18 0.18 20.40
Denmark 123 1.21 1.21 21.61
Djibouti 18 0.18 0.18 21.79
Dominica 18 0.18 0.18 21.97
Dominican Republic 48 0.47 0.47 22.44
Ecuador 50 0.49 0.49 22.93
Egypt 139 1.37 1.37 24.30
El Salvador 59 0.58 0.58 24.88
Eritrea 17 0.17 0.17 25.05
Estonia 34 0.34 0.34 25.39
Ethiopia 71 0.70 0.70 26.09
Fiji 62 0.61 0.61 26.70
Finland 21 0.21 0.21 26.90
France 279 2.75 2.75 29.65
Gabon 40 0.39 0.39 30.05
17
Appendix 2
Table B: List of target states
Freq. Percent Valid Cum.
Gambia, The 20 0.20 0.20 30.25
Georgia 15 0.15 0.15 30.39
Germany 138 1.36 1.36 31.75
Ghana 20 0.20 0.20 31.95
Greece 62 0.61 0.61 32.56
Guatemala 43 0.42 0.42 32.99
Guinea 17 0.17 0.17 33.15
Haiti 44 0.43 0.43 33.59
Honduras 60 0.59 0.59 34.18
Hungary 45 0.44 0.44 34.62
Iceland 29 0.29 0.29 34.91
India 117 1.15 1.15 36.06
Indonesia 92 0.91 0.91 36.97
Iran 83 0.82 0.82 37.78
Iraq 36 0.35 0.35 38.14
Ireland 73 0.72 0.72 38.86
Israel 261 2.57 2.57 41.43
Italy 211 2.08 2.08 43.51
Japan 340 3.35 3.35 46.86
Jordan 87 0.86 0.86 47.72
Kazakhstan 18 0.18 0.18 47.90
Kenya 15 0.15 0.15 48.04
Korea, Democratic People's Rep. of 92 0.91 0.91 48.95
Korea, Republic of 225 2.22 2.22 51.17
Kuwait 21 0.21 0.21 51.37
Kyrgyz Republic 17 0.17 0.17 51.54
Lao People's Democratic Republic 76 0.75 0.75 52.29
Latvia 18 0.18 0.18 52.47
Lebanon 71 0.70 0.70 53.17
Lesotho 44 0.43 0.43 53.60
Liberia 34 0.34 0.34 53.94
Libya 68 0.67 0.67 54.61
Lithuania 17 0.17 0.17 54.77
Luxembourg 13 0.13 0.13 54.90
Malawi 37 0.36 0.36 55.27
Malaysia 167 1.65 1.65 56.91
Mali 20 0.20 0.20 57.11
Malta 19 0.19 0.19 57.30
Mauritius 18 0.18 0.18 57.48
Mexico 119 1.17 1.17 58.65
Mongolia 18 0.18 0.18 58.83
Morocco 40 0.39 0.39 59.22
Myanmar 40 0.39 0.39 59.61
Namibia 18 0.18 0.18 59.79
Nauru 17 0.17 0.17 59.96
Nepal 46 0.45 0.45 60.41
Netherlands 148 1.46 1.46 61.87
New Zealand 61 0.60 0.60 62.47
Nicaragua 41 0.40 0.40 62.88
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Table B: List of target states
Freq. Percent Valid Cum.
Niger 20 0.20 0.20 63.07
Nigeria 27 0.27 0.27 63.34
Norway 89 0.88 0.88 64.22
Pakistan 83 0.82 0.82 65.03
Panama 49 0.48 0.48 65.52
Paraguay 43 0.42 0.42 65.94
Peru 50 0.49 0.49 66.43
Philippines 74 0.73 0.73 67.16
Poland 91 0.90 0.90 68.06
Portugal 117 1.15 1.15 69.21
Russian Federation 120 1.18 1.18 70.40
Rwanda 20 0.20 0.20 70.59
Samoa 18 0.18 0.18 70.77
Saudi Arabia 98 0.97 0.97 71.74
Senegal 20 0.20 0.20 71.93
Sierra Leone 20 0.20 0.20 72.13
Singapore 88 0.87 0.87 73.00
Slovak Republic 17 0.17 0.17 73.16
Slovenia 34 0.34 0.34 73.50
South Africa 194 1.91 1.91 75.41
Spain 151 1.49 1.49 76.90
Sri Lanka 57 0.56 0.56 77.46
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 18 0.18 0.18 77.64
Sudan 19 0.19 0.19 77.83
Sweden 70 0.69 0.69 78.52
Switzerland 81 0.80 0.80 79.31
Syrian Arab Republic 133 1.31 1.31 80.62
Taiwan 64 0.63 0.63 81.26
Tajikistan 17 0.17 0.17 81.42
Tanzania 33 0.33 0.33 81.75
Thailand 119 1.17 1.17 82.92
Togo 20 0.20 0.20 83.12
Trinidad and Tobago 20 0.20 0.20 83.32
Tunisia 11 0.11 0.11 83.42
Turkey 159 1.57 1.57 84.99
Uganda 82 0.81 0.81 85.80
Ukraine 53 0.52 0.52 86.32
United Kingdom 253 2.49 2.49 88.81
United States 688 6.78 6.78 95.59
Uruguay 43 0.42 0.42 96.02
Uzbekistan 17 0.17 0.17 96.19
Vanuatu 44 0.43 0.43 96.62
Venezuela 73 0.72 0.72 97.34
Vietnam 139 1.37 1.37 98.71
Zambia 18 0.18 0.18 98.89
Zimbabwe 113 1.11 1.11 100.00
Total 10147 100.00 100.00
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Table 1A: Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Threat without imposition 10147 .049 .216 0 1
Imposition without threat 10147 .06 .237 0 1
Imposition with threat 10147 .184 .388 0 1
Log exports 9549 19.479 2.792 3.449 26.595
Log exporter GDP 10081 13.242 2.521 4.72 16.505
Log Importer GDP 9934 10.954 2.533 4.038 16.505
Log exporter population 10126 4.404 1.571 -1.132 7.194
Log importer population 10123 3.068 1.715 -2.748 7.194
Exporter democracy 10147 .795 .404 0 1
Importer democracy 10098 .59 .492 0 1
RTA 10147 .07 .256 0 1
Common currency 10147 .024 .153 0 1
WTO/GATT 10147 .668 .471 0 1
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Table 2A: Control variables for the main results in Table 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES lnexports lnexports lnimports lnimports
Log exporter GDP 0.578*** 0.605*** 0.746*** 0.758***
(0.122) (0.132) (0.0862) (0.0911)
Log importer GDP 0.669*** 0.682*** 0.826*** 0.803***
(0.0703) (0.0747) (0.100) (0.108)
Log exporter population 0.220 0.0753 0.582 0.587
(0.558) (0.615) (0.423) (0.506)
Log importer population -0.587* -0.561 -0.363 -0.329
(0.337) (0.358) (0.373) (0.401)
Exporter democracy 0.0734 0.123 -0.0332 -0.0249
(0.113) (0.115) (0.150) (0.152)
Importer democracy 0.0328 0.0382 -0.0865 -0.0829
(0.0797) (0.0812) (0.0911) (0.0946)
Regional trade agreement 0.372*** 0.387*** 0.244* 0.232*
(0.127) (0.137) (0.128) (0.141)
Common currency 0.0405 -0.124 0.697** 0.468
(0.227) (0.190) (0.337) (0.370)
WTO 0.478*** 0.500*** 0.468*** 0.466***
(0.101) (0.105) (0.109) (0.118)
Multilateral resistance term
Distance -0.147 -0.118 -0.124 -0.119
(0.0900) (0.0950) (0.0951) (0.102)
Common language 0.0129 -0.0513 0.0203 0.165
(0.306) (0.329) (0.294) (0.308)
Colonial ties 0.143 0.151 -0.0437 -0.213
(0.343) (0.376) (0.322) (0.331)
Common currency -0.309 -0.126 -0.686 -0.546
(0.285) (0.263) (0.438) (0.512)
Border -0.0489 -0.0827 -0.210 -0.257
(0.226) (0.229) (0.219) (0.236)
RTA -0.179 -0.134 0.0686 0.117
(0.153) (0.162) (0.159) (0.176)
WTO/GATT -0.327 -0.389 -0.164 -0.173
(0.224) (0.239) (0.203) (0.222)
Constant 5.470* 5.444* 0.0404 -0.198
(2.887) (3.183) (2.059) (2.291)
Observations 9,293 8,540 9,321 8,553
R-squared 0.548 0.539 0.586 0.571
Number of countrypairs_id 398 398 399 399
Cluster robust standard errors at the level of country pairs in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1: The impact of threatened/imposed sanctions on international trade
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES lnexports lnexports lnimports lnimports
Threat(without imposition)t 0.258*** 0.123** 0.155* 0.0998*
(0.0776) (0.0494) (0.0819) (0.0604)
Threat(without imposition)t−1 0.0842** 0.0157
(0.0339) (0.0386)
Threat(without imposition)t−2 0.0882* 0.0677
(0.0524) (0.0507)
Imposition (without threat)t -0.293*** -0.181*** -0.387*** -0.240***
(0.104) (0.0696) (0.126) (0.0805)
Imposition (without threat)t−1 -0.118** -0.181**
(0.0511) (0.0710)
Imposition (without threat)t−2 -0.0750 -0.166*
(0.0669) (0.0902)
Imposition (with threat)t -0.298*** -0.171*** -0.179** -0.108*
(0.0820) (0.0499) (0.0820) (0.0556)
Imposition (with threat)t−1 -0.0824*** -0.0505
(0.0313) (0.0332)
Imposition (with threat)t−2 -0.149*** -0.109**
(0.0512) (0.0473)
Constant 5.470* 5.444* 0.0404 -0.198
(2.887) (3.183) (2.059) (2.291)
Observations 9,293 8,540 9,321 8,553
R-squared 0.548 0.539 0.586 0.571
Number of country-pairs_id 398 398 399 399
MTR Proxies included Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed and time eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster robust standard errors at the level of country pairs in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2: The impact on exports of threats emanating from diﬀerent sources
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES lnexports lnexports lnexports lnexports
Threat issued by government 0.219***
(0.0838)
Threat issued by trade/foreign institution 0.315***
(0.101)
Threat issued by the legislature 0.272***
(0.0861)
Threat issued by International organizations. 0.257*
(0.137)
Constant 5.733** 5.788** 5.667* 5.777**
(2.888) (2.889) (2.889) (2.890)
Observations 9,029 8,911 9,027 8,867
R-squared 0.545 0.546 0.549 0.543
Number of country-pairs_id 398 398 398 398
Cluster robust standard errors at the level of country pairs in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3: Impact of diﬀerent types of instruments on trade
Threat Imposition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES lnexports lnimports lnexports lnimports
Total economic embargo 0.635 0.202 -1.567*** -2.449***
(0.729) (0.197) (0.420) (0.502)
Partial economic embargo 0.0558 0.0278 -0.345* -0.150
(0.290) (0.241) (0.202) (0.212)
Import restriction 0.249*** 0.238*** -0.0286 -0.0342
(0.0712) (0.0785) (0.0474) (0.0839)
Export restriction 0.142 0.0803 -0.231 -0.0638
(0.0936) (0.126) (0.177) (0.280)
Economic blockade 0.171* 0.139 -0.140 -0.442
(0.0887) (0.127) (0.222) (0.316)
Asset freeze 0.172 0.246 -0.566* -0.378
(0.584) (0.475) (0.326) (0.498)
Foreign aid cut 0.202** 0.0661 -0.181*** -0.177*
(0.0811) (0.105) (0.0643) (0.0937)
Travel ban -0.0127 0.229 0.000502 0.315
(0.138) (0.257) (0.172) (0.284)
Economic agreement ban 0.127 0.293* -0.382 -0.196
(0.111) (0.174) (0.326) (0.450)
Imposition (without threat) -0.291*** -0.387***
(0.104) (0.126)
Imposition (with threat) -0.274*** -0.175**
(0.0758) (0.0757)
Threat (without imposition) -0.0231 -0.00297
(0.0362) (0.0513)
Constant 5.455* 0.0247 5.803** 0.159
(2.894) (2.062) (2.773) (2.006)
Observations 9,293 9,321 9,293 9,321
R-squared 0.548 0.586 0.571 0.611
Number of country-pairs_id 398 399 398 399
Cluster robust standard errors at the level of country pairs in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4: The impact of sanctions on essential products
Exports Imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Essential products Food and animal products Medicines Essentials products Food and animal products Medicines
threat 0.0634 0.0694 0.123 0.0715 0.00241 0.128
(0.0826) (0.0890) (0.0897) (0.0739) (0.0788) (0.139)
sanction2 -0.0382 -0.0396 -0.124* -0.0273 -0.182 -0.0311
(0.0841) (0.102) (0.0751) (0.0798) (0.130) (0.140)
sanction3 -0.192*** -0.229*** -0.136* 0.0149 0.00453 -0.00781
(0.0690) (0.0734) (0.0800) (0.0505) (0.0594) (0.0872)
Constant 2.194 -2.004 -7.036 3.522 -4.939 4.445
(3.759) (3.481) (5.393) (3.005) (3.248) (5.363)
Observations 6,195 6,756 6,284 5,162 6,783 5,207
R-squared 0.428 0.286 0.457 0.478 0.238 0.449
Number of country-pairs_id 345 371 348 334 372 336
Cluster robust standard errors at the level of country pairs in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5: Possible endogeneity concerns
Five-year window First-diﬀerencing GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES lnexportslnimports D.lnexportsD.lnimports lnexports lnimports
L.lnexports 0.345***
(0.00395)
L.lnimports 0.298***
(0.00431)
Threat(without imposition) 0.246*** 0.183** 0.0988*** 0.0133*
(0.0856) (0.0898) (0.00676) (0.00749)
Imposition(without threat) -0.290** -0.422*** -0.0738***-0.211***
(0.112) (0.136) (0.00719) (0.00838)
Imposition(with threat) -0.288*** -0.205** -0.0967***-0.0104**
(0.0904) (0.0918) (0.00557) (0.00505)
FD.Threat(without imposition) 0.0692*** 0.0409
(0.0249) (0.0252)
FD.Imposition(without threat) -0.0771** -0.103**
(0.0342) (0.0402)
FD.Imposition(without threat) -0.0898*** -0.0480**
(0.0203) (0.0193)
Constant 6.956*** 4.319*** -0.00379 -0.00286 -0.544 2.036
(1.743) (1.406) (0.0191) (0.0206) (1.328) (1.332)
Observations 9,293 9,321 8,778 8,802 8,335 8,350
R-squared 0.548 0.583 0.065 0.045
Number of country-pairs_id 398 399 391 395
P-value for Hansen J test 1.00 1.00
P-value for ﬁrst-order auto-correlation test 0.000 0.000
P-value for second-order auto-correlation test 0.871 0.976
Cluster robust standard errors at the level of country pairs in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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